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LESSONS FROM THE CAMBODIAN
EXPERIENCE WITH TRUTH
AND RECONCILIATION
John D. Ciorciari*and Jaya Ranji-Nogales**

INTRODUCTION

As South Koreans seek to implement the recommendations of their
country's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) effectively, Cambodia may not be an immediately intuitive place to look for guidance. Cambodia has never convened a formal truth and reconciliation process or
produced an extensive official report of human rights violations with specific policy recommendations. Nevertheless, and starting from the understanding that social processes leading to reconciliation are necessarily
different in different societies, the Cambodian experience does offer some
important lessons for South Korea and other states working to satisfy the
rights and needs of victims of past abuses. In particular, the Cambodian
case may offer a useful example in navigating the complex politics that
generally characterize transitional justice processes.
We focus on two central claims about the Cambodian experience.
First, the Cambodian example highlights the importance of engaging local
civil society to play a central role in truth and reconciliation initiatives.
Where, as in Cambodia, political elites prioritize the maintenance and
growth of their own power, they tend to subordinate certain truths and pursue a shallow form of reconciliation that privileges their narrow interests.
The needs of ordinary survivors are often sidelined. Though civil society
has fewer resources and less formal power and authority than the government and international institutions in organizing truth and reconciliation initiatives, it often has the advantage of being more responsive to societal
interests. It also tends to be less encumbered by the political gridlock generated by competition among domestic political parties and international
actors. Local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are particularly well
positioned to assess and address survivors' needs.
* Assistant Professor, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of
Michigan. The author has been a Legal Advisor to the Documentation Center of Cambodia since 1999.
** Associate Professor, Beasley School of Law, Temple University. The author
has been a Legal Advisor to the Documentation Center of Cambodia since 1997.
The authors thank Lisa Laplante, Tara Melish, David Westbrook, and Roger
DesForges for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft. Thanks also to Rachel
Farr for timely research assistance.

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

In Cambodia, international NGO involvement in truth and reconciliation initiatives has been limited, both because of local political interference
and resource constraints. Thus, many of the most active civil society
groups in the truth and reconciliation arena have been local. These groups
generally have less funding and transitional justice "expertise" than international organizations, but they draw on more relevant cultural resources, so
may be preferable in the long run. Moreover, the growth of local groups
addressing reconciliation issues may help to establish a more robust civil
society that can contribute to deliberative political processes and a more
stable democratic future.
Second, Cambodia offers a case study of questions of institutional sequencing in transitional justice efforts. In any society, responses to mass
human rights abuses entail political and societal dialogue about what goals
to pursue, through what institutional mechanisms, and in what order. We
discuss how the space for pursuing truth and reconciliation initiatives has
broadened over time in Cambodia, where official efforts initially focused on
solidifying peace and only later turned to questions of transitional justice.
We also examine the ways in which mechanisms that are not aimed
primarily at promoting truth and reconciliation may create openings in the
political sphere for truth and reconciliation processes in other forms. In
Cambodia, a hybrid court established in 2006 by the Cambodian government and United Nations has been the central avenue for accountability for
the crimes of the Khmer Rouge regime. Though the tribunal includes innovative measures for victim participation and collective moral reparations, it
is not an ideal vehicle for truth and reconciliation. The impact of the proceedings on public knowledge and victims' healing has been modest to
date, and "donor fatigue" resulting from the costly tribunal makes it unlikely that funds will be forthcoming for an official TRC in Cambodia.
Despite these issues, we argue that the existence of this court has
helped to establish the political space for individual Cambodians and civil
society organizations to institute important and innovative truth and reconciliation measures. Those non-governmental groups have been the unofficial implementing agencies of some of the steps that the South Korean TRC
recommended-such as creating accessible archives, providing human
rights education, and rewriting official history books. Many of these efforts
have taken place at grassroots levels, but some have translated into key
national policy programs. Thus Cambodia offers at least two lessons for
implementing TRC recommendations: the importance of engaging local
civil society and seizing the perhaps unexpected benefits that can be derived
from particular institutional sequences.
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I.

DEFINING TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN CAMBODIA

Implementing measures to advance truth and reconciliation raises difficult questions within a society, let alone across different societies. What
aspects of truth should be the focus? What kind of reconciliation is sought,
and for whom? Both of these concepts are inherently culturally bound, and
definitions necessarily privilege some normative goals at the expense of
others. Indeed, to define these terms too precisely belies some of their essence; truth and reconciliation are ideas shaped partly through a complex
and often contested process of political and social dialogue.
We begin with the premise that truth and reconciliation mean different
things to different members of a society at different times.' From that starting point, we present some of the varied ways in which truth and reconciliation have been defined and pursued in Cambodia in an effort to assess the
particular needs of ordinary Cambodian survivors. From this case study,
and again acknowledging the societally and temporally contingent nature of
the concepts of truth and reconciliation, we can carefully uncover cultural
and historical parallels that might enable us to draw out lessons for South
Korea and other countries.
Truth is, of course, a complex concept. Truth-seeking projects and
commissions have emphasized multiple forms of truth when they have defined the term at all. 2 Truth is also subject to multiple interpretations within
Cambodia. 3 To many Cambodians, knowing "the truth" about the Khmer
Rouge era means, above all, learning the facts surrounding their own painful experiences and the fate of lost loved ones. To others, truth is primarily
something for victims to express-a device for empowerment and opportunity to have one's voice heard after more than thirty years of being effectively silenced. Still others yearn to understand why the abuses happenedto hear explanations directly from the mouths of perpetrators and to understand how the broader system of repression functioned. These differing pri1. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Designing Bespoke TransitionalJustice: A PluralistProcess Approach, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 22 (2010).
2. Most legal instruments establishing truth commissions have failed to define
"truth" precisely. Audrey R. Chapman & Patrick Ball, The Truth of Truth Commissions: ComparativeLessonsfrom Haiti,South Africa, and Guatemala, 23 HUM RTS. Q.

1,4-12 (2001). The South African TRC was the most explicit, emphasizing four forms
of truth: factual or forensic truth, personal or narrative truth, social or "dialogue" truth
that emerges from public interaction and debate, and restorative truth-a concept
closely linked to acknowledgement. I TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF
SOUTH AFRICA REPORT 110 (1999).
3. SUZANNAH LINTON, RECONCILIATION IN CAMBODIA 126 (2004).
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orities around truth suggest the need for different transitional justice
approaches within one or multiple mechanisms.
Reconciliation also lends itself to numerous definitions that vary and
even compete along several axes, including goals, subject, and scope. It is
widely understood as a long-term process, the objectives of which may
themselves be rich concepts such as truth, justice, and peace. 4 Reconciliation can signify an end of armed conflict or tense political divisions, but it
can also refer to individuals' need for a degree of personal healing or closure. The Khmer concept of reconciliation, karphsasphsa, implies both. It

literally means "reconnecting the broken pieces" and suggests a process of
healing, both internally and by bringing former enemies back together. 5
Rebuilding a shattered society requires reconciliation at the individual,
community, and national levels as people mutually acknowledge past suffering and re-establish productive relationships.
Survey evidence captures the complexity and dynamism of the concept
of reconciliation as Cambodians come to terms with the past. Analysts
from the University of California-Berkeley's Human Rights Center surveyed 1,000 Cambodians in late 2008 and conducted a second survey in
December 2010. In 2008, respondents characterized reconciliation as the
absence of violence and conflict (56%), unity and living together (33%),
and communication and mutual understanding (9%).6 In 2010, 54% of respondents focused on unity and living together, 38% on communicating and
4. Most definitions of reconciliation suggest a process of acknowledging and grappling with the past, coming to understand it, and changing attitudes to make more positive relationships possible. See, e.g., LINTON, supra note 3, at 106; and Brandon
Hamber & Grdinne Kelly, Beyond Coexistence: Towards a Working Definition of Reconciliation, in RECONCILIATION(S): TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN POSTCONFLICT SOCIETIES
287-95 (Joanna R. Quinn ed., 2009). South Africa's Archbishop Desmond Tutu has
described reconciliation as involving "a very long and painful journey, addressing the
pain and suffering of the victims, understanding the motivations of offenders, bringing
together estranged communities, trying to find a path to justice, truth and, ultimately,
peace." Desmond Tutu, Foreword to RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT: A
HANDBOOK 4 (David Bloomfield, Teresa Barnes & Luc Huyse eds., 2003).
5. Ana Garcfa Rodicio, Restorationof Life: A New TheoreticalApproach to Repatriation based on a Cambodian Experience of Return, 13 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 126
(2001); Action Asia, Exploring Asian Approaches to Peace Building - PracticalInsights and Reflections 32 (2007), <http://www.actionasia.org/fileadmin/user-upload/

ExploringAsianApproaches toPeacebuilding book l.pdf>.
6. Phuong Pham et al., Human Rights Ctr., Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, So We Will
Never Forget: A Population-BasedSurvey on Attitudes about Social Reconstruction

and the ExtraordinaryChambers in the Courts of Cambodia 28 (Jan. 2009), http://

www.law.berkeley.edu/HRCweb/pdfs/So-We-Will-Never-Forget.pdf [hereinafter 2009
Berkeley Report].
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mutual understanding, and only 15% on an absence of violence and conflict. 27% also suggested that reconciliation meant having gentleness and
compassion for one another. 7 Reconciliation in Cambodia is a multi-level,
multi-faceted process.
Governments, non-state organizations, and ordinary people may promote the varied goals of reconciliation in a number of ways. While amnesty programs might advance the goal of short-term peace, criminal trials
and civil remedies (such as awards of reparations) might offer a greater
measure of justice, and truth and reconciliation commissions may present a
broader picture of the truth. A variety of other measures such as public
ceremonies, memorials, and individual or community-level counseling can
supplement efforts to advance these and other goals. Not all of these approaches work synergistically all of the time, however. As John Paul
Lederach argues, the process of reconciliation often involves dealing with
profound paradoxes: trying to build a shared future while seeking truths
about a divided past and promoting mercy and mutual acceptance while
insisting on justice and accountability for past offenses. 8 The difficulty of
marrying all aspects of reconciliation simultaneously points to the importance of timing. Institutions must sometimes be sequenced in a way that
prioritizes different goals over time, thus meeting the needs of broader segments of society.
In Cambodia, reconciliation initiatives to date have focused primarily
on healing scars from the Khmer Rouge period. That period was the most
terrifying in the country's history, but it was not the only period of human
rights abuses. Like the process of deciding what truth bears telling, choosing the reference point for reconciliation entails powerful normative and
political considerations.

II.

THE WINNOWING OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN

CAMBODIA, 1979-2006
Official efforts at truth and reconciliation in Cambodia have been
deeply intertwined with power politics. In particular, they have been associated with the rise of the Vietnam-backed People's Republic of
7. Phuong Pham et al., Human Rights Ctr., Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, After the First
Trial: A Population-BasedSurvey on Knowledge and Perception of Justice and the
ExtraordinaryChambers in the Courts of Cambodia 33 (July 2011) http://www.law.

berkeley.edu/HRCweb/pdfs/After-the-First-Trial.pdf [hereinafter 2011 Berkeley Report]. Figures do not add up to 100%, because the survey allowed respondents to emphasize more than one aspect of reconciliation.
8.

JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE: SUSTAINABLE RECONCILIATION IN

VIDED SOCIETIES

31 (1997).

Di-
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Kampuchea (PRK), which supplanted Pol Pot in January 1979, and the subsequent reemergence of PRK leaders as the Cambodian People's Party
(CPP) in the 1990s. The CPP's approach to reconciliation has prioritized
political consolidation and an end to armed conflict, offering a form of forgiveness to Khmer Rouge members willing to acquiesce in CPP leadership.
In terms of institutional sequencing, then, the PRK and CPP prized amnesty
over accountability. The CPP has also introduced efforts at truth and justice, but generally in a way calculated to advance its political position. This
focus on "macro-reconciliation"-maintaining peace and stability at the national level-was necessary to some degree during the years of armed conflict and insurgency that stretched from 1979 into the mid-1990s. However,
the justification for focusing on macro-reconciliation has weakened over
time.
Compromises among rival political groups are rarely enough to foster
broad revelations of the truth or deep grassroots reconciliation. The focus
on political stability in Cambodia, in part through formal or informal amnesty schemes, has imposed limits on "micro-reconciliation" at the level of
individuals and communities. 9 Many survivors cite Khmer Rouge impunity
as a source of continuing anguish and an obstacle to personal healing.1°
Even more describe their inability to understand the atrocities as a barrier to
reconciliation." Until very recently, official Cambodian history textbooks
included just a single line about the Pol Pot regime. Complaints of physical
and emotional injury are ubiquitous, pointing to another macro-level failure
with micro-level consequences: the virtual absence of even rudimentary
counseling and health services. 12 The Cambodian government and key international actors could not have been expected to solve all of these chal9. See generally John D. Ciorciari, Cambodia's Trek Toward Reconciliation, 23
PEACE REV.

438 (2011).

10. In the 2008 Berkeley survey, nearly 40% of respondents said that top Khmer
Rouge leaders needed to be punished before they could forgive them. 2009 Berkeley
Report, supra note 6, at 29-30. See also John D. Ciorciari and Sok-Kheang Ly, The
ECCC's Role in Reconciliation, in

ON TRIAL: THE KHMER ROUGE ACCOUNTABILITY

at 335-39 (John D. Ciorciari & Anne Heindel eds., 2009).
11. In the 2008 Berkeley survey, 64% of respondents agreed with the statement
that they could not reconcile without knowing the truth about what happened. Large
majorities indicated that they wanted to know more about the Khmer Rouge regime,
and most reported their knowledge of the period as poor or very poor-especially those
who did not live through it. 2009 Berkeley Report, supra note 6, at 25-27. See also
Sok-Kheang Ly, Follow-up Survey on NationalReconciliation (2007) (on file with the
Documentation Center of Cambodia).
12. For a discussion of Cambodia's challenges in meeting even rudimentary
PROCESS,

mental health care needs, see generally

CAMBODIA'S

Schaack, Daryn Reicherter & Youk Chhang eds., 2011).

HIDDEN

SCARS

(Beth Van
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lenges. However, Cambodia's experience illustrates how reconciliation
processes can be unresponsive to individual and community needs when the
legitimate aim of securing the peace and the significantly less legitimate
goal of gaining or preserving political power drive institutional design and
sequencing decisions. Moreover, reconciliation processes designed without
the regular and active participation of civil society are significantly less
likely to address these needs.
A.

Early Efforts at Truth and Reconciliation

Immediately after the toppling of the Pol Pot regime, the new PRK
government and its Vietnamese allies placed a legitimate priority on quelling the large Khmer Rouge insurgency and pacifying a country where impulses for revenge were strong. The goals of peace and political stability
drove institutional design decisions, and transitional justice mechanisms
were created and implemented by the government alone. In the years following the Pol Pot regime, much of the population harbored vindictive feelings against former Khmer Rouge cadres. Revenge killings took place in
various parts of the country, as survivors took reprisal for the deaths of their
loved ones and other members of their communities. The PRK faced a
dilemma. Many of its officials and troops also sought revenge against the
Khmers Rouges, and demonizing the Pol Potists helped legitimize PRK
rule. However, violent reprisals against some former Khmer Rouge cadres
threatened to exacerbate Cambodia's civil war by pushing greater numbers
of former Khmer Rouge rank and file into the jungles, where they would
fight alongside Pol Pot's forces instead of defecting to the new government
or dropping their arms. The PRK thus had an incentive to stop the revenge
killings, even if it had little sympathy for Khmer Rouge cadres.
The PRK instituted a kind of reconciliation plan, offering carrots to
defecting Khmer Rouge soldiers while also wielding a formidable stick.1 3
The plan entailed using military counter-insurgency measures to coerce
rebels to "reconcile" while issuing leaflets and radio broadcasts promising

13. Later in the conflict, hundreds of thousands of Cambodians were recruited or
compelled to participate in the "K-5" scheme by helping to lay landmines and build a
wall to separate Khmer Rouge guerillas form the rest of the population. EVAN GorEsMAN, AFTER THE KHMER ROUGE: INSIDE THE POLITICS OF NATION-BUILDING 231-37
(2002). It resulted in thousands of deaths and injuries on both sides of the conflict and
contributed to lasting resentment in some communities against the PRK (and later the
CPP).
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leniency to Khmer Rouge rebels who laid down their arms, apologized,
14
underwent reeducation, and rejoined the fold.
In August 1979, the PRK arranged a transitional justice process: a
five-day trial of Pol Pot and one of his deputies, Ieng Sary. The "People's
Revolutionary Tribunal" returned history's first genocide conviction. The
trial it held was connected closely to the government's defection policy. By
pinning the blame on Chinese "hegemonists" and a handful of domestic
villains, the trial presented the rest of society as victims, which the PRK
hoped would dampen revenge killings and keep frightened former Khmer
Rouge rank and file from joining the insurgency.
The strategy succeeded in abating revenge killings and attracting many
Khmers Rouges to lay down their arms or join the PRK. The tribunal also
provided some useful information and public recognition of the suffering of
millions of people under Khmer Rouge rule. However, many survivors
found the trials inadequate to make them forgive and reconcile with lowlevel Khmer Rouge cadres. The trials were also riddled with procedural
flaws and were rejected outside the country as a way to justify the
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Rather than helping the new government solidify control, many outside powers-including China, Thailand,
and the West-supported a coalition of royalists, right-wing republican
rebels, and Khmers Rouges to fight Vietnam and bleed its Soviet sponsors.
That "Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea" (CGDK) continued to occupy Cambodia's seat at the UN General Assembly.
From 1980 to 1983, the PRK carried out additional measures to supplement criminal trials. The most important of these efforts was the nationwide review and condemnation of Khmer Rouge atrocities by the
government organization Renakse (Salvation Front). The Renakse organized a series of community meetings in 1983 that had much of the appearance of a truth commission, although they were not labeled as such. The
committee in charge of the process interviewed survivors around Cambodia, amassed evidence of damage done by the Khmer Rouge to people and
property, dug up mass graves, examined documents, and wrote a report to
the government. The Renakse commission also invited victims to sign petitions enumerating Khmer Rouge atrocities in particular parts of the country.
5
According to PRK authorities, nearly 9,000 petitions were drafted.
14. Sok-Kheang Ly, State and Individual Efforts to Bring about Reconciliation

(Documentation Center of Cambodia, Aug. 2009).
15. For further discussion of the PRK petitions, see William J. Schulte, THE HisTORY OF THE RENAKSE PETITIONS AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE TO THE

IN SEARCHING FOR THE TRUTH (Dec.

ECCC

PROCEEDINGS

2007). Well over 1,000 petitions survive today in
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Unfortunately, the Renakse truth commission-type process was not
nearly as effective as it could have been. Like the 1979 trials, it suffered
from both procedural flaws and over politicization. Most of the Renakse
petitions were drafted by PRK officials and revealed a nakedly political
purpose by laying out the PRK's case for prying Cambodia's seat at the UN
General Assembly away from the CGDK. The government also did little to
disseminate its findings to the public. Further, the process included no
Khmer Rouge voices, preventing the occurrence of genuine dialogue between former foes.' 6 The Renakse process also did little to encourage public apologies that could have facilitated healing. Without the involvement
of civil society, the PRK government furthered its own goals but failed to
address many of the needs of Cambodian society.
The PRK government did engage in other, slightly more successful
efforts to promote reconciliation. The PRK regime erected stupas-Buddhist religious monuments used for worship and remembrance-and other
memorials at nearly 100 of the most infamous sites of Khmer Rouge terror
around the country. It also helped ordinary villagers excavate the remains
of the departed from more than 19,400 mass burial pits across the countryside. As many Cambodians believed that victims who died violent deaths
and received improper burials would not be able to be reborn, this official
assistance was an important recognition of their religious and cultural beliefs. In Cambodia, memorials were the first real step towards addressing
individual and community needs. These relatively small-scale and uncontroversial processes may have represented the limits of political viability in
a highly unstable society.
The government also developed ceremonies around the memorials,
though these were often co-opted for partisan political ends. Beginning on
May 20, 1983, Cambodians began to celebrate a "Day of Anger" to recall
the abuses of the Khmer Rouge regime and share their pain. Much like the
1979 trials and Renakse inquiries, the PRK government used the Day of
Anger to legitimize its rule and mobilize public support for the ongoing
counterinsurgency campaign. A speech by President of the PRK National
Assembly Chea Sim on the 1986 Day of Anger reflected this dynamic:
Beloved comrades and friends... those who died are reminding
us to be vigilant, to strengthen our solidarity and practice revolution-

the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) archives, containing the signatures
or thumbprints of 1,166,307 victims.
16. CRAIG ETCHESON, RECONCILIATION IN CAMBODIA: THEORY AND PRACTICE 43
(2004).

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

ary activities. We must be on the alert against the cruelties and poisonous tricks of the enemy...17
In the context of a continuing guerilla war, the Day of Anger functioned
more as a rallying cry against the surviving Khmer Rouge movement than
as a call to lay down arms and reconcile. Even after the dissolution of the
Khmer Rouge insurgency, Cambodian leaders have too often used the Day
of Anger to stir vitriol for the sake of partisan advantage, undermining or
perhaps even eliminating the ceremony's contribution to reconciliation.
Alongside modest advances in national-level reconciliation, Cambodia
saw private efforts at micro-reconciliation during the 1980s. Largely religious in nature, the relative success of these efforts in addressing the needs
of Cambodians speaks to the importance of involving local non-governmental actors in reconciliation processes. The most prominent occasion for
such efforts has been the annual pchum ben festival, a traditional Khmer
day of remembrance of the dead. According to traditional Khmer Buddhist
religious beliefs, the gates of hell open once each year, and departed souls
wander the earth. Cambodians gather at pagodas and place food such as
rice balls on the earth to ease the spirits' suffering. The ceremony has added significance with respect to Khmer Rouge victims, as traditional beliefs
suggest that spirits are condemned to wander the earth and barred from
reincarnation until they are acknowledged in a religious ceremony. Pchum
ben has provided a way for many Cambodians to do so for departed loved
8
ones who never received a proper burial.'
Religious spaces-including Buddhist wats, mosques, and churchesthat had faced relentless attacks under the Pol Pot regime thus became key
public spaces for personal and community reconciliation. The country's
beleaguered educational system, which devoted a mere sentence to the
Khmer Rouge era in history texts, and a virtually non-existent mental health
system made communities of faith all the more crucial in survivors' quests
for a sense of healing and inner peace.
B.

UNTAC: PrioritizingPeace

As the Cold War wound down, Vietnam looked for a way out of Cambodia as its Soviet sponsors turned inward. The major external powers be17. Translated by Sour Bunsou and quoted in Rachel Hughes, Memory and Sovereignty in Post-1979 Cambodia: Choeung Ek and Local Genocide Memorials in GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA AND RWANDA: NEW PERSPECTIVES 267 (Susan E. Cook ed., 2006).
18. Ly Daravuth, Notes on Pchum Ben, Brandeis University International Center
for Ethics, Justice and Public Life, 6-8 <http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/peacebuilding
arts/pdfs/peacebuildingarts/y%20notes-on-pchumben-2.pdf>; Lor Chandara, Festival
of the Dead Remembers Torture Victims of KR, CAMBODIA DAILY, Sept. 25, 2000.
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gan to negotiate a settlement-again, prioritizing peace over justice. To
most of the key parties, peace meant an end to armed hostilities and putting
Cambodia on a democratic trajectory. The permanent five members of the
Security Council and other key states pressed on Cambodia's various factions, including the Khmer Rouge, to hammer out a peace deal.
The result, finalized on October 23, 1991, was the Paris Peace Accords, which established an eighteen-month UN Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC). The most ambitious peacebuilding initiative in UN
history, it provided for military peacekeepers, civil administration, and UNsponsored elections in 1993. However, it did not focus on truth, reconciliation and justice, largely because its architects feared such provisions would
lead Khmer Rouge insurgents to spoil the peace. That fear was reasonable,
as the Khmers Rouges violated the UN ceasefire on numerous occasions
and boycotted the elections. There was little political space for accountability efforts at that juncture. However, the country did not relapse into war,
and the 1993 elections helped marginalize Pol Pot's forces politically. UNTAC provided neither trials nor amnesty, deferring but not precluding truthtelling exercises and other forms of transitional justice.
C.

Hun Sen's "NationalReconciliation" Policy

During the 1990s, Prime Minister Hun Sen used amnesty as part of an
effort to pursue peace, an approach that served to increase his political
power but compromised the goal of justice and did nothing to advance
truth. The 1993 elections resulted in an unstable truce between Hun Sen
and Norodom Ranariddh, the head of the royalist party Funcinpec, who
agreed to serve as co-prime ministers in a constitutional monarchy headed
by Ranariddh's father, King Norodom Sihanouk, who had allied loosely
with the Khmers Rouges as the political face of the CGDK during the
1980s.
As Hun Sen and Ranariddh competed for influence, Hun Sen pursued
a policy of "national reconciliation" focused on courting Khmer Rouge defectors on terms that would benefit his political party, the CPP. He
brokered a key 1996 deal with Khmer Rouge leader Ieng Sary, who defected with roughly 3,000 of his fighters-a substantial fraction of the total
insurgent ranks-in exchange for a royal amnesty and pardon granted by
King Sihanouk in September of the same year. Those defections almost
brought the Khmer Rouge armed resistance to a halt.
In 1997, Hun Sen achieved a decisive upper hand, when he accused
Ranariddh of a plot to use Khmer Rouge guerillas to seize power, and CPP
forces defeated royalist partisans in a series of bloody street battles. Hun
Sen occasionally advocated justice-most notably in a June 1997 letter he

204
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co-authored with Ranariddh to the United Nations requesting support to
establish a tribunal 9-but tended to pit peace against truth and accountability. In December 1998, he famously declared that defecting Khmer Rouge
leaders Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan should be greeted "with bouquets
of flowers, not with prisons and handcuffs" and that Cambodians should
"dig a hole and bury the past." 20 The plan failed to produce meaningful
apologies from Khmer Rouge leaders; Pol Pot's second-in-command, Nuon
Chea, issued vague regrets for "lives lost" and for "animals that died;" his
'2 1
colleague, Khieu Samphan, urged the public to "let bygones be bygones.
22
These dismissals of societal suffering did nothing to ease survivors' pain.
In early 1999, Cambodian authorities apprehended two more notorious
Khmer Rouge figures-Duch, who headed the central torture facility at
Tuol Sleng, and zone commander Ta Mok, also known as "the Butcher."
The insurgency had essentially crumbled, increasing the practical possibility of trials or a truth commission. The imperatives of war and peace no
longer limited the political and societal dialogue to the same extent, and
more civil society leaders began to press for transitional justice. However,
along the way, Pol Pot had died, the CPP had signed an amnesty deal with
Khmer Rouge leader leng Sary, and other former Khmers Rouges occupied
positions at all levels of government. Hun Sen considered the possibility of
trials, but emphasized that they should be done "in the context of war and
peace [and] in the context of national reconciliation, which is all one
'23
package.

19. Identical letters from Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General, to the President of
the General Assembly and to the President of the Security Council (Jun. 23 1997),
(annexed to U.N. Doc. A/51/930, S/1997/488 (Jun. 24, 1997)); Letter from Prince
Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen, respectively the First and Second Prime Ministers of
Cambodia, to Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General (Jun. 21, 1997), (annexed to U.N.
Doc. A/51/930, S/1997/488 (Jun. 24, 1997)).
20. John Gittings, Pol Pot Men Say Sorryfor Killing Fields, THE GUARDIAN, Dec.
30, 1998.
21. Seth Mydans, Under Prodding, 2 Apologize for Cambodian Anguish, N.Y.
TIMES,

Dec. 30, 1998.

22. On Cambodian responses to the defections and subsequent statements of
Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea, see Wendy Lambourne, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding:
Meeting Human Needs for Justice and Reconciliation, 4 PEACE, CONFLICT & DEV. 1,
11-12 (2004).
23. Cambodian Prime Minister seeks reconciliationthrough reconstruction,EIR
News Service, Feb. 12, 1999 (interviewing Hun Sen).
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Choosing a Tribunal over a Truth Commission

It was in that context that the United Nations, led by the United States
and allied Western powers, began to press more assertively for transitional
justice. Thomas Hammarberg, the UN Secretary-General's human rights
24
representative in Cambodia, called for a truth commission.
In early 1999, a Group of Experts appointed by UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan recommended an international trial of some twenty to thirty
suspects. Though noting that a truth commission "could not replace prosecutions for Cambodia in terms of the goals of justice, closure and accountability," the UN Group of Experts recommended "a process of reflection
among Cambodians" to determine the appropriateness and potential design
of a truth commission for Cambodia. 25 Hun Sen responded by saying he
preferred a "truth commission" that would swap amnesty deals for Khmer
Rouge confessions.
There was little political space available for a truth commission, however. Some international observers saw it as a way for the Cambodian government to avoid delivering justice. Cambodian political elites and some
international donors may also have been concerned about a truth commission's ability to investigate the multitude of unclean hands in Cambodia's
modern history. There were also concerns that any such process would risk
reopening old wounds and destabilizing fragile relations between former
Khmers Rouges and their neighbors.
In terms of institutional sequencing, then, there was not much choice;
both the Cambodian government and the United Nations favored a tribunal
rather than a truth commission. Both invoked the concept of "reconciliation," but to different political ends. The UN Group of Experts argued that
justice would facilitate reconciliation, and that an international tribunal, perhaps in The Hague, would be the most legitimate and effective locus for
criminal trials. Hun Sen contended that sending Khmer Rouge suspects to a
foreign court would reignite the insurgency and that the government knew
best how to keep the peace. The CPP's favored form of stability implied
further consolidation of domestic political dominance. After several years
of tense negotiations, the two sides compromised, agreeing to form a "hybrid" tribunal within Cambodia's judicial system.
24. Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human
Rights in Cambodia, Mr. Thomas Hammarberg, submitted in accordance with Commission resolution 1996/54, Comm. on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/85, §D
(Jan. 31, 1997).
25. Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to G.A.
Res. 52/135,
200, 219, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/135 (Feb. 18, 1999).
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THE KHMER ROUGE TRIBUNAL, 2006-PRESENT

The result was the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
(ECCC), a mixed tribunal combining international and domestic laws, procedures, and personnel. 26 Both sides favored a relatively narrow judicial
inquiry focused on surviving "senior leaders" and others deemed "most responsible" for gross human rights abuses during Pol Pot's reign. The tribunal was thus designed in a manner that would contribute toward a set of
truths acceptable both to its national and international sponsors. Each side
believed it would foster a form of reconciliation, but they differed on the
particulars. International actors and human rights advocates generally
sought a process that would strengthen the rule of law and by extension
drive domestic political reforms in Cambodia; the CPP sought a brand of
reconciliation that would reinforce its domestic political position.
Most Cambodians surveyed about the tribunal process sought justice,
but also put a high priority on learning the truth about their personal suffering and the reasons for the terror of Democratic Kampuchea. Many sought
explanations from Khmer Rouge leaders, apologies, and an opportunity to
participate. Unfortunately, the architects of the ECCC did not design the
tribunal in a way well suited to satisfy those preferences. To a large degree,
these were left to civil society to fulfill.
A.

Design of the Tribunal

Courts have inherent limitations as mechanisms for promoting truth
and reconciliation. They necessarily focus on facts most relevant to determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. Thus, they can have the unintended-or in some cases intended-consequence of masking structural
and systemic patterns of injustice that may be at the root of the mass violence.27 Trials are also complex, and can be difficult for ordinary survivors
to follow. Advocates contend that they facilitate reconciliation by assigning
culpability, acknowledging victims' suffering, expunging impunity, and
26. Cambodia enjoys an edge, appointing a majority of judges and occupying key
administrative functions, such as the heads of the Public Affairs office and the Victims
Unit. For a detailed review of the court's judicial and administrative structure, see
Anne Heindel, Overview of the ExtraordinaryChambers, in ON TRIAL, supra note 10,
at 85-112; John A. Hall, Court Administration at the ECCC, in ON TRIAL, supra note
10, at 172-81.
27. Rama Mani, Reparation as a Component of TransitionalJustice: Pursuing
"ReparativeJustice" in the Aftermath of Violent Conflict, in

OUT OF THE ASHES: REPA-

RATION FOR VICTIMS OF GROSS AND SYSTEMIC HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

(K. De Feyter et al. eds. 2005).

53, 53, 68
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helping build a stronger rule of law. Those outcomes are all eminently
desirable, but they do not automatically lead to a broad rendering of the
truth or to reconciliation. In fact, by reinforcing a victim-perpetrator di28
chotomy, trials may further entrench post-conflict social divisions.
There are nevertheless important strengths in the ECCC's institutional
design, proceedings, and setting that give the tribunal the potential to facilitate truth-telling and contribute to reconciliation. The ECCC's in-country
setting facilitates connections with the public that would be impossible for
trials in The Hague. The ECCC also has mechanisms enabling survivors to
submit complaints and an innovative scheme whereby victims can join the
proceedings as civil parties in addition to other forms of participation. Yet
the tribunal has made slow progress to date, completing just one trial and
suffering from chronic political and administrative crises. Its provisions for
29
victim participation have also had mixed results.
B.

Victim Participation

Participation in the ECCC's proceedings might have enabled
Cambodians to speak the truth and have their voices heard. In theory, increasing victims' active involvement in a trial process is more likely to
result in victim healing. 30 In practice, the forms of survivor participation
allowed at the ECCC - witness testimony, civil party participation, the submission of written complaints, and attendance in the viewing hall - have so
far failed to contribute much to this form of truth.
The first form of participation is through testimony, which offers the
opportunity for victims to interact most intensively with the judicial process. At times, testifying can have a cathartic effect. 31 Yet testifying, at
least in Case 001, has been insufficiently empowering for participants for a
few reasons. First, the Trial Chamber has used its rules of conduct to discipline witnesses whose testimony strayed beyond the limited scope of the
Chamber's evidentiary needs. 32 The court's inquiries, which are restricted
28. Id. at 67.
29. See generally Toni Holness & Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Participationas Reparations: The ECCC andHealing in Cambodia,in CAMBODIA'S HIDDEN SCARS, supra note
12, at 172.
30. Brandon Hamber, The Dilemmas of Reparations: In Search of a ProcessDriven Approach, in OUT

OF THE ASHES: REPARATION

FOR VICTIMS

OF GROSS AND

135, 149 (K. De Feyter et al., eds. 2005).
31. John D. Ciorciari & Anne Heindel, Trauma in the Courtroom, in CAMBODIA'S

SYSTEMATIC HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

HIDDEN SCARS: TRAUMA PSYCHOLOGY IN THE WAKE OF THE KHMER ROUGE,

supra note

12, at 123-29 (providing some examples from the Duch case, as well as counterexampies suggesting re-traumatization).
32. Holness & Ramji-Nogales, supra note 29, at 172, 174-75.
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to admissible evidence, do not always match the interests or needs of victims. Judges have asked witnesses to restrain themselves emotionally and
restrict their testimony to only those facts that judges consider useful. Second, the ECCC has been inaccessible to many of the witnesses both because
of the rigidity of its technical rules regarding testimony and its intimidating
and unfamiliar appearance. 33 Witnesses have become preoccupied with rule
compliance, hindering the expression of the substance of their testimony.
Third, some testifying survivors have found the physical structure and technologies of the ECCC intimidating and emotionally challenging. 34 The imposing physical presence of the court building and the sophisticated
technology upon which the court process relied were often entirely alien to
witnesses, many of whom scarcely have access to electricity in their home
villages.
The ECCC is the first international criminal tribunal to implement a
second form of victim participation: the civil party process. Through this
mechanism, victims who allege that they suffered direct abuses as a result
of a defendant's conduct can participate in the proceedings by filing documents and presenting arguments before the tribunal. 35 The civil party process has been limited or problematic in a variety of ways, and as a result has
failed adequately to enable Cambodian voices. First, the ECCC Internal
Rules necessarily preclude most Cambodians from participating as civil
parties if they cannot establish a link to a particular defendant's crimes.
Indeed, in the first trial against Duch, the former head of the Khmer Rouge
torture and interrogation facility at Tuol Sleng, the tribunal dismissed applications of some for failure to prove a close bond of affection with or dependency on one of Duch's victims. 36 The extent of participation by those
selected was also limited given legitimate resource and time constraints in
the court. 37 The relatively low number of civil party petitioners suggests a
33. Id. at 177.
34. Id.

35. Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Internal Rules (Rev. 8),
rev'd Aug. 3, 2011, at 22 [hereinafter ECCC Internal Rules], available at http://www.
eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-documents/ECCC%20Internal%2ORues%20(Rev.
8)%2OEnglish.pdf.
36. Prosecutor v. Guek Eav Kaing alias Duch, Case File No. 001/18-07-2007ECCC/TC ECCC, Transcript of Trial Proceedings-Kaing Guek Eav "Duch", at 27
(July 26, 2010) [hereinafter 26 July 2010 transcript], http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/El_83.1_TROOI_20100726_Final ENPub.pdf.
37. See Sarah Thomas, Civil Party Participationat the ECCC, INTLAwGRRLS
(July 15, 2008), availableat http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2008/07/civil-party-participation-at-eccc.html (discussing the reasons for the ECCC's change in attitude, from
welcoming to exclusionary, toward civil parties).
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fear of proceedings; it may also reflect a lack of detailed knowledge about
3s
or interest in the ECCC.
A third way to participate is through victim complaints, which might
have presented an opportunity to enable victims to speak the truth and be
heard. Here the court's main challenge has been capacity. Given the huge
number of aggrieved victims, the court's understaffed, underfunded Victims' Unit has had a difficult time even acknowledging complaints in a
timely manner, which risks undermining petitioners' confidence in the exercise. In 2009, a non-Cambodian with strong ties to the government and
links to a Marxist organization became head of the Victims' Unit. 39 She
later stepped down, but to some survivors that appointment diminished the
unit's legitimacy. Public confidence in the tribunal, and particularly the
Victims' Unit, is imperative if participation is to be reparative.
A fourth way to participate is to observe the trial proceedings from the
gallery or on television. The ECCC Internal Rules authorize judges to limit
observers' emotional expression during trials, 40 which has hindered the potential reparative effect that might have resulted from a more interactive
process. Although one of the espoused benefits of an in-country tribunal is
its proximity to survivors, the facility in Phnom Penh remains inaccessible
38. The 2008 Berkeley survey found that 85% of respondents reported having no
or limited knowledge of the ECCC. 2009 Berkeley Report, supra note 6, at 3. The
2010 survey showed progress: only 38% of respondents described their knowledge of
the ECCC as limited, while 67% could accurately describe the basic hybrid nature of
the court. 2011 Berkeley Report, supra note 7, at 3. A 2009 survey by the International
Republican Institute again showed that general public awareness about the trials had
risen and that roughly one third of respondents had seen part of the trials on television.
Survey of Cambodian Public Opinion, INT'L REPUBLICAN INST. 32-39 (July 31 - Aug.
26, 2009), http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2010%20February%202%20Survey%20
of%20Cambodian%2OPublic%200pinion,%2OJuly%203 I-August%2026,%202009%20

-%20Khmer%20and%20English%20version.pdf.
39. One Khmer Rouge survivor wrote, "[Ilit is both absurd and insulting to have a
Marxist advocate representing the victims of a Marxist regime, which was being tried
by the court of law." Chanda Chhay, Open Letter to Dr. Helen Jarvis,Appointed Head
of the Victims Unit at the ExtraordinaryChamber in the Courtof Cambodia,KI-MEDIA

(June 20, 2009), http://ki-media.blogspot.com/2009/O6/open-letter-to-dr-helen-jarvis.
html. See also Patrick Falby, Cambodia KRouge court leaves victims disappointed,
AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Sept. 13, 2010, availableat http://lg-media.blogspot.com/2009/09/
cambodia-krouge-court-leaves-victims.html.

40. "Where, in the view of the Chambers, any person is disrupting the proceedings, they shall first issue a warning. In cases of continued disruption, the Chambers
may order the person disrupting the proceedings to leave or be removed from the courtroom or the premises of the ECCC and, in case of repeated misconduct, may order the
exclusion of that person from attending the proceedings." ECCC Internal Rules, supra
note 35, at 35.
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to most indigent survivors in the countryside, and televised viewing is unavailable in most of the country.
C.

The ECCC's Effects on Reconciliation to Date

There is some evidence that the ECCC is contributing to reconciliation
if we define the term as unity, communication, and compassion. 4 1 The
2010 Berkeley survey found that 80% of respondents believed the ECCC
would help rebuild trust and promote national reconciliation in Cambodia,
and roughly 25% expected that the trials would help ease mental anguish
among individual survivors. 42 Finally, contrary to the expressed fears of the
Cambodian government that efforts to end impunity would lead to fresh
violence, the first five years of the ECCC's operations have not prompted
outbreaks of violence, and upheaval appears unlikely in the near future. The
passage of time is one reason, but another appears to be broad-based public
acceptance of the basic legitimacy of the process.
However, the ECCC is also plagued by severe and ongoing weaknesses that limit its potential to bring justice, truth, or reconciliation to victims of the Pol Pot regime. Public in-fighting between the United Nations
and Cambodian government has intensified the politicization of the process
and eroded the tribunal's independent judicial credibility. 43 In particular, a
feud between the Cambodian government and selected UN staff about
whether to add additional defendants has caused both delay and despair
among some survivors, who seek additional prosecutions." A significant
number of Cambodians remains skeptical of the contribution of the trials to
reconciliation. They retain deep-seated anger toward both Khmer Rouge
leaders and the lower-level cadres who inflicted abuse on their families.
Another crucial limitation of the civil party scheme relates to reparations. Cambodia clearly lacks the financial resources to provide a level of
financial restoration that would compensate millions of victims fully for the
41. See infra discussion of Cambodian definitions of reconciliation. Interviews
with survivors after the Duch trial suggest a modest positive contribution for many
observers of the process but also residual anger and a suspicion of the sincerity or value
of apologies by those deemed most responsible for Khmer Rouge atrocities. See Ciorciari & Ly, supra note 10, at 334-39.
42. 2011 Berkeley Report, supra note 7, at 7-10.
43. See, e.g., Sophal Ear, Editorial, Khmer Rouge Tribunal vs. Karmic Justice,
INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Mar. 17, 2010; John Hall, A U.N. Fiascoin Cambodia, WALL
ST. J. ONLINE, Oct. 5, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702046125
04576608511111845334.html.
44. See, e.g., Statement by the InternationalCo-InvestigatingJudge, EXTRAORDI
NARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA,

statement-international-co-investigating-judge.

http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/
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personal and economic losses they suffered. In the ECCC, Internal Rule 23
quinquiesprovides that the court may award only collective and moral reparations to Civil Parties. 45 It adds that such reparations "shall be awarded
against, and be borne by convicted persons," and may comprise orders to
publish the judgment in news or other media at the convicted person's expense; orders to fund a non-profit activity or service that is intended for the
benefit of victims; or "other appropriate and comparable forms of
46
reparation."
The language of Rule 23 does not necessarily limit reparations to a
convicted person's resources, but it also makes no explicit provision for
other sources of funding. Duch responded to an inquiry regarding reparations by stating that he does not "have any ability to assist anybody at this
stage. '47 Other defendants are also apt to have little if anything to contribute to financial reparations. Any reparative awards will at best be of symbolic significance when measured against the myriad survivors who
endured the brutal policies of the Pol Pot regime.
The tribunal has the power to grant collective and moral reparations,
and non-governmental groups suggested a variety of options, such as health
clinics and memorials. However, the court lacks the power to require government action to establish such facilities and depends on donor resources
to carry out its mandate. At the end of the Duch case, it offered victims
only two meager forms of collective and moral reparation: inclusion of the
names of civil parties and their relatives who died at S-21 in the judgment,
and an online compilation of statements of apology made by Duch during
48
the trial.
IV.

REMAINING CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED

Cambodia has taken some steps toward truth and reconciliation, but
the process remains far from complete. Cambodia's experience with truth
and reconciliation suggests several lessons that can be usefully applied in
South Korea and other states working to implement recommendations related to truth-telling, memory preservation, reparative justice, apologies,
45. See ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 35, at 25.
46. Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Internal Rules (Rev. 5),
rev'd Feb. 5, 2010, at 25 [hereinafter ECCC Internal Rules (Rev. 5)], availableat http:/f
www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-documents/lRv5-EN.pdf.

47. Prosecutor v. Guek Eav Kaing alias Duch, Case File No. 001/18-07-2007ECCC/TC ECCC, Transcript of Trial Proceedings - Kaing Guek Eav "Duch", at 114
(Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/
courtdoc/El_63.1_TROO120090817_FinalEN Pub.pdf.
48. 26 July 2010 transcript, supra note 36, at 28.
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and reconciliation. The role of civil society has been crucial in implementing each of these goals in Cambodia. While the official transitional justice
mechanisms to date have been less than effective in achieving these goals,
the ECCC has created political space that has made progress towards these
goals possible.
A.

The Role of Justice

The importance of justice to reconciliation, both in its retributive and
restorative forms, has been clear in Cambodia. The failure to deal decisively with the problem of impunity has impeded reconciliation for many
Cambodian survivors. Youk Chhang, the director of the Documentation
Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), has argued that: "Peace requires more than
the absence of armies in open combat. A peaceful society is a just society,
and the Cambodian people have not yet found justice. Peace will not truly
come to Cambodia until there is real justice for the crimes of the Khmer
Rouge regime. '49 The ECCC has put a handful of people on trial, but slow
progress and their advancing ages means they may never be convicted. The
narrow scope of the court's jurisdiction also leaves many observers perceiving the tribunal more as political theater than justice. Participants in the
trials, who have been few in number relative to the millions of victims of
Khmer Rouge brutality, generally have been unable to contribute to truthtelling in a form that would be empowering to them. Without genuine apologies or explanations from the architects of Khmer Rouge terror, many
have been unable to trust or forgive former Khmer Rouge cadres living in
their midst.
Cambodia also shows the difficulty of using judicial processes as a
means to reparative justice. Khmer Rouge misrule and years of ensuing
war decimated an already weak economy and left the state with little capacity to provide meaningful reparation to victims even if it had wished to do
so. South Korea's greater wealth may enable it to offer non-trivial compensation to many victims, but if Cambodian survivors' attitudes are any indication, money will be far from sufficient to provide meaningful reparation.
Relatively few Cambodians interviewed about the Khmer Rouge accountability process seek financial remedies. Many more demand the truth about
lost relatives and the circumstances of their own suffering.

49. Youk Chhang, Speech for the Truman-Reagan Freedom Award, Washington,
DC (Nov. 4,2000), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20081121044203/ http:/!
www.wccpd.org/news/news70.html.

2012]
B.

Lessonsfrom Cambodian Experience

Truth through Public Education

A number of scholars and human rights groups have advocated a truth
commission in Cambodia. 50 A body empowered to investigate and remedy
past abuses could build upon the limited truth told by the ECCC. Nevertheless, a formal truth commission in Cambodia is quite unlikely. Donors have
already begun to waver on the commitment of additional resources to the
ECCC, and the government has long been wary of a broad-based TRC process. The ECCC can help through effective outreach, but its account of the
past will be focused on the specific charges against the defendants in
custody.
In the absence of a broader TRC process, educational initiatives are
particularly crucial-as they likely will be in South Korea and other states
seeking to implement truth-telling recommendations. Cambodians want to
know more about their country's history. The 2010 Berkeley survey found
that 67% of Cambodians who lived under the Khmer Rouge and 85% who
51
did not, wanted to know more about the Pol Pot era.
In recent years, the Cambodian government has made more extensive
progress by partnering with DC-Cam and other civil society groups. 52 For
years, Cambodian textbooks had only a single line devoted to Khmer Rouge
history. The Cambodian government generally shied away from grassroots
programs that encourage more robust discussion of Khmer Rouge atrocities
and contribute to a fuller historical account. This avoidance was in part due
to the intense emotional sensitivity of the issues and possibility of social
conflict, and in part due to the fear that a full vetting of the truth would
expose some unwanted facts about the history of groups or individuals currently in power.
Since 2008, DC-Cam and the Ministry of Education have undertaken a
major nationwide project to reform school curricula, added a course at secondary school and university levels on Khmer Rouge history, and trained
teachers and lecturers on pedagogy. With authority from the government,
50. See, e.g., Jaya Ramji, Reclaiming CambodianHistory: The Casefor a Truth
FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF. 137 (2000).
51. 2011 Berkeley Report, supra note 7, at 32.
52. DC-Cam is a non-governmental organization dedicated to promoting memory
and justice with respect to Khmer Rouge atrocities. It was established in 1995 as the
field office of Yale University's Cambodian Genocide Program. In 1997, DC-Cam
became an independent Cambodian NGO with funding from diverse states and international agencies, and it runs projects related to Khmer Rouge history, public education,
accountability promotion, community reconciliation, and support for the ECCC. See
THE DOCUMEN~TATION CENTER OF CAMBODIA, www.dccam.org (last visited Apr. 16,
2012).
Commission, 24

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

DC-Cam has also established an extensive archive of documents on Khmer
Rouge history available to researchers. Any country pursuing the emerging
norm of a "right to the truth" should enact a law pertaining to the declassification and disclosure of government records related to human rights
abuses.53 This and other measures can assist civil society to play a central
role in disseminating truth through public education.
C.

Reconciliation through Community Dialogues

Though the ECCC has had a mixed record in establishing reconciliation, it has spurred innovative and effective civil society efforts to engage
Cambodians at the community level. These structured dialogues have enabled more widespread consumption of the results of the trials as well as
conversations about the losses suffered at the hands of the Khmer Rouge.
Perhaps most importantly, they create a space for victims and perpetrators
to interact, and foster understanding and forgiveness.
DC-Cam has brought more than fifteen thousand representatives of
communities throughout Cambodia to learn about the ECCC. At the beginning of these visits, the DC-Cam hosts legal training sessions that explain
the Court's jurisdiction and procedures and describe the biographies of the
defendants. After attending hearings at the ECCC, the community representatives return to the DC-Cam for a facilitated discussion of their experience at the Court. They take this experience back to their villages, where
they discuss and lead group dialogues about the trials (with the support of
DC-Cam staff and other experts). These community forums include
Cambodians from neighboring villages that do not have a representative at
the trials. The public discussion of suffering under the Khmer Rouge brings
the shared experiences of the villagers into the open and begins the process
of community-wide healing.
The community dialogues also play an important role for the surviving
Khmer Rouge cadres, who continue to be haunted by the fear of revenge.
53. The right to the truth for victims of human rights violations has been recognized by a number of United Nations bodies, as well as by regional human rights courts
and numerous national governments though the establishment of specific archives or
through general freedom of information laws. See, e.g., Claude-Reyes et al. v. Chile,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.T. (ser. C) No. 151 (Sept.
19, 2006); International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, G.A. Res. 61/177, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/177 (2006) (entered into force
Dec. 23, 2010); Right to the Truth, Human Rights Council Res. 9/11, UN Doc. A/HRC/
Res/9/1 1(2008); Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human
Rights through Action to Combat Impunity, UN Comm. for Human Rights, UN Doc. E/
CN.4/2005/102/ADD.l (Feb. 8, 2005).
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Many former lower-level cadre live in perpetual worry that the victims who
live in their villages will engage in violent retribution against them. Former
Khmer Rouge cadres are grateful for the opportunity that the dialogues provide to foster understanding among community members and opportunities
for forgiveness. These community forums also help to dispel any fears or
misunderstandings that former cadre may have about the possibility of being prosecuted by the ECCC.
Perhaps most importantly, the community dialogues empower
Cambodians themselves to structure a healing process that is most appropriate to address their unique needs. This community input is valuable not
only in ensuring the legitimacy of the forum and the engagement of villagers, but also in creating a lasting impact on communities. Officials and civil
society leaders seeking to build a reconciliation process should consider
how they can ensure that it is not only participant-designed and driven, but
also inclusive of all societal groups, including perpetrators. Moreover, even
if primary accountability efforts do not meet community needs, the political
space they create can be leveraged in the service of processes that are more
responsive to local concerns.
D.

Public Memorials and Ceremonies

Cambodian experience also points to the value of neutral, non-political
public memorials and ceremonies, such as a monument to the departed and
a national day of remembrance. In Cambodia, ceremonies and memorials
have been more conducive to healing when they have focused on sharing
communal suffering and honoring loved ones rather than focusing enmity
on perpetrators and their kin. They have also been most effective when
they have tapped into local cultural and religious norms associated with
healing. In Cambodia, that has often meant appealing to Buddhist principles of tolerance and forgiveness, but other faiths have proven equally central to reconciliation efforts elsewhere. A strong role for local community
and religious organizations is crucial. Such ceremonies and events must be
above the fray of partisan politics if they are to encourage reconciliation
rather than sowing renewed divisions. In practice, that means advocates of
such initiatives need to exercise considerable discretion and restraint.
IV.

CONCLUSION

A few broad lessons emerge from the Cambodian case. We start from
the premise that measures in pursuit of truth and reconciliation need to be
designed and sequenced in the context of local culture and political condi-
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tions to be effective.5 4 The implementation of truth and reconciliation initiatives must be driven by the preferences of those who need to be
reconciled. Studies like those undertaken by the UC-Berkeley Human
Rights Center deserve replication elsewhere-inviting views of survivors
on what would best help them heal.5 5 This is especially true in societies in
which political gridlock slows progress at the official level and draws initiatives into partisan debates. However, even where power politics drives institutional sequencing, these politicized processes may help to create
political space for bottom-up, grassroots truth and reconciliation efforts.
Civil society groups can and should play a central role in such reconciliation initiatives. Such groups will be best able to build neutral, nonpolitical forums for truth telling involving genuine dialogue between survivors and perpetrators.5 6 Dialogue can humanize complex historical conflicts and enable former adversaries to engage positively with one another.
Moreover, in order to create a more comprehensive and accurate historical
picture and help answer the question of "why?," the process needs to allow
safe space for both victims and perpetrators to share their experiences. The
engagement of civic and religious leaders can help to ensure that these dialogues are tailored to local sensibilities and therefore more effective as rec57
onciliation processes.
54. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Designing Bespoke TransitionalJustice:A PluralistProcess Approach, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (2010).

55. Id. at 63-66.
56. Id. at 61-62.
57. Id. at 66.

